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NOTES
COVERT ENTRY IN ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE: THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT REQUIREMENTS
INTRODUCTION
More than a decade ago, the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York' and
Katz v. United States2 set forth stringent fourth amendment requirements for
government-conducted electronic surveillance of conversation. 3 Neither deci-
sion indicated, however, whether additional requirements must be met when
government agents, instead of confining themselves to surveillance techniques
like wiretaps that can be conducted from outside of the search premises,4
covertly enter s private premises to install and maintain surveillance equip-
1. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
2. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3. In Berger, the Court held that the then existing New York electronic surveillance statute
was offensive to the fourth amendment for a myriad of reasons: (1) the statute did not compel the
government to show that a specific crime had been or was being committed; (2) although it
required an express mention of the persons whose conversations were to be overheard in the
warrant, the statute did not demand a particular description of the conversations to be obtained;
(3) it did not require prompt execution; (4) it allowed authorization of surveillance for an
excessively lengthy and continuous period; (5) it permitted renewal of the surveillance on less than
probable cause after the lapse of the original order;, (6) it did not mandate that the surveillance
must be terminated upon accomplishment of its goals; (7) it did not require the government to
show exigency in order to conduct surveillance; and (8) it did not require a return on the
surveillance order. 388 U.S. at 58-60. Whereas Berger set down guidelines for electronic
surveillance in a case that arose from a surveillance implemented by a physical intrusion, see id.
at 45, the Court in Katz held that surveillance without physical intrusion also constituted a search
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 389 U.S. at 353. In so doing, the Court applied the
Berger standards to surveillances not implemented by entry. See id. at 354-56.
The federal statute controlling government-conducted surveillance, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520
(1976), is the codification of the major portion of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 212 (1969). The drafters of the statute
strove to comply with the Berger and Katz fourth amendment standards without unduly
hindering law enforcement. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 130 (1978); United States
v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 302 (1972); S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
75, reprinted in [1968] U.S. Code & Ad. News 2112, 2163. The federal statute is preemptive of
state legislation to the extent that state law is less restrictive of surveillance practices. United
States v. Curreri, 388 F. Supp. 607, 613 (D. Md. 1974); People v. Conklin, 12 Cal. 3d 259, 272,
522 P.2d 1049, 1057, 114 Cal. Rptr. 241, 250 (1974). See generaUy J. Carr, The Law of
Electronic Surveillance § 2.0411] (1977).
4. See United States v. Finazzo, No. 77-5186, slip op. at 9 n.13 (6th Cir. Aug. 28, 1978).
5. As used in this Note, covert entry will refer to the physical presence, without consent, of
government agents in private premises which: (1) if occurring in a seizure of tangibles, as
opposed to an interception of conversations, would constitute a search within the meaning of the
fourth amendment; and (2) was established by breaking-and-entering or by deceit.
This definition applies to at least one of the police maneuvers at issue in each of the cases that
have examined the fourth amendment standards for covert entry in surveillance. The entries in
question were executed by means of either deceit or by breaking-and-entering and invaded a
residence or a nonpublic area of a commercial building. See, e.g., United States v. Dalia, 575
203
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ment.6 When confronted with this question of whether additional fourth
amendment requirements exist for the covert entry itself, lower courts have
reached conflicting results.7
F.2d 1344, 1345 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 78 (1978) (No. 77-1722). Moreover, entries
without consent into residences or nonpublic commercial areas most always constitute searches.
See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (homes); See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967) (commercial building areas not open to the public); United
States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (homes); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 442 n.74 (1974) (commercial building areas not open
to the public). The sole exception to this rule is the so-called technical trespass which Invades
areas lacking the obviously private character of the apartments, after-business-hour offices, and
backrooms that have been the target of surveillance in the cases at issue. See generally Note, The
Relationship Between Trespasses and Fourth Amendment Protection After Katz v. United States,
38 Ohio St. L.J. 709 (1977).
6. Although Berger involved surveillance implemented by intrusion into private premises, see
note 3 supra, both the proponents and opponents of additional fourth amendment requirements
for covert entry in implementation of surveillance agree that the Berger guidelines were aimed
solely at the intrusion represented by the overhearing of conversation. Compare United States v.
Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 644 (2d Cir. 1977) (Gurfein, J., concurring), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903
(1978) with United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
7. See United States v. Dalia, 575 F.2d 1344, 13,4-46 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 78
(1978) (No. 77-1722) (covert entry reasonable when executed in a reasonable manner and when
there is probable cause for the underlying surveillance); United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633,
639-40 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903 (1978) (express authorization of covert entry
unnecessary); In re United States, 563 F.2d 637, 644-46 (4th Cir. 1977) (covert entry must be only
effective means of conducting investigation and must be expressly authorized); United States
v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 152-70 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (covert entry must be necessary to conduct
surveillance and must be expressly authorized); United States v. Finazzo, 429 F. Supp. 803, 807
(E.D. Mich. 1977) (covert entry must be expressly authorized), qff'd, No. 77-5186 (6th Cir. Aug.
28, 1978); United States v. Volpe, 430 F. Supp. 931, 942-43 (D. Conn. 1977) (covert entry
reasonable when there is probable cause for underlying surveillance); United States v. London,
424 F. Supp. 556, 560 (D. Md. 1976) (express authorization of covert entry unnecessary), qOf'd on
other grounds sub nom. United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1977).
The question of whether covert entry in surveillance is per se unreasonable, i.e., violative of
the fourth amendment irrespective of the judicial procedures controlling the entry and the public
interest at stake, will not be discussed. This Note will assume, as have most courts, that covert
entry is not per se unreasonable. Those courts implicitly deciding that covert entry is not per se
unreasonable are: United States v. Dalia, 575 F.2d at 1346; United States v. Scaidi, 564 F.2d at
640; In re United States, 563 F.2d at 644; United States v. Volpe, 430 F. Supp. at 942-43; United
States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879, 883 (D.D.C. 1976), f'd on other grounds, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); United States v. London, 424 F. Supp. at 560. Two courts have expressly reserved the
issue of whether covert entry is per se unreasonable. See United States v. Finazzo, No. 77-5186,
slip op. at 26 (6th Cir. Aug. 28, 1978); United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d at 170. One court has
expressly decided that covert entry is not per se unreasonable. United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d
690, 695-98 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977). Sitting en banc, the Eighth
Circuit split evenly in refusing to grant a rehearing in Agrusa. Id. at 704. The four judges who
wished to grant a rehearing expressed the view that covert entry in implementation of surveil-
lance is per se unreasonable. Id. The view that covert entry is not per se unreasonable has
recently been reiterated by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Costanza, 549 F.2d 1126, 1135
(8th Cir. 1977).
This Note will also presume: (1) that there is some sort of inherent or statutory power vested in
federal judges to grant authority to government officials to enter covertly so long as an adequate
showing of justification under the fourth amendment has been made; and (2) that federal law
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This Note will contend that there are three fourth amendment requirements
for covert entry in addition to those for the surveillance itself. Part I will show
that electronic surveillance implemented by covert entry satisfies the fourth
amendment's reasonableness requirement only if surveillance without covert
entry is inadequate. As Part H will demonstrate, the government must make
this showing of reasonableness prior to obtaining a warrant, or, as it is
commonly referred to in electronic surveillance operations, a surveillance
order. Part I will submit that the particularity clause of the fourth amend-
ment requires that covert entry must be expressly authorized in the surveil-
lance order.
I. THE REASONABLENESS REQUIREMENT
The fourth amendment requires that all government searches and seizures,
including electronic surveillance operations, must be reasonable.8 The test of
reasonableness mandates that the government interest outweigh the intrusive-
ness of the search or seizure. 9 A reasonable belief that criminally related
objects are to be found in the area of the search is usually a sufficient
government interest to satisfy the reasonableness test.10
Exceptionally intrusive searches are reasonable, however, only if justified
by an additional government interest.11 Thus, for example, body intrusions
are reasonable only when there is a dear indication, as opposed to a mere
reasonable belief, that the objects of the search will be found within the
body.12 Furthermore, even if a dear indication is present in the case of a body
officers have sufficient power to enter covertly so long as the substantive and procedural
requirements of the fourth amendment are satisfied. See United States v. Dalia, 575 F.2d at 1346;
United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d at 640; In re United States, 563 F.2d at 642; United States v.
Agrusa, 541 F.2d at 701; cf. United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d at 151 n.20 (reserves question of
judicial power to authorize and proceeds to discussion of substantive and procedural require-
ments for entry). But see United States v. Finazzo, No. 77-5186, slip op. at 2.
8. The fourth amendments reasonableness requirement reads: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated .... " U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967), the Court applied this general proscription to electronic surveillance.
9. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967); see United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,
322-23 (1972).
10. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 534-35 (1967).
11. The Court has repeatedly stated that the sufficiency of the public interest must parallel
the gravity of an intrusion. See cases cited note 9 supra. The Court has also stated that "[tihe
Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable also may limit police
use of unnecessarily frightening or offensive methods of surveillance and investigation." United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975).
12. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The Court decided that, although
searches incidental to arrest ordinarily can be conducted upon probable cause for the arrest itself,
an intrusion into the body, such as a blood test for alcohol, could only be conducted when there is
a ciear indication that evidence is present. Id. at 769-70. The California Supreme Court has
viewed Schmerber as imposing a more stringent test. People v. Bracamonte, 15 Cal. 3d 394, 403,
540 P.2d 624, 630, 124 Cal. Rptr. 528, 534 (1975); People v. Hawkins, 6 Cal. 3d 757, 763, 493
P.2d 1145, 1148, 100 Cal. Rptr. 281, 284 (1972); accord, Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 390;
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intrusion, the search is not reasonable if it brutalizes or endangers the
suspect.13 A second class of exceptionally intrusive searches, no-knock entries,
which are unannounced entries into occupied premises, 14 is justifiable only
under exigent circumstances. I s Finally, the electronic surveillance of conver-
sation is reasonable only when the normal investigative means of gathering
evidence have failed, are likely to fail, or appear to be too dangerous.
16
Just as electronic surveillance is more burdensome upon the search subject
than normal investigatory means, electronic surveillance implemented by
covert entry is appreciably more intrusive than electronic surveillance that is
McKenna, The Constitutional Protection of Private Papers: The Role of a Hierarchical Fourth
Amendment, 53 Ind. L.J. 55, 75-76 (1977); Note, Constitutional Law: Supreme Court Delineates
the Relationship Between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 1967 Duke L.J. 366, 385 & n. 110,
386; 55 Texas L. Rev. 147, 156 (1976).
The only contrary interpretation of the Schmerber clear indication rule appears In border
search cases. E.g., Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966) (probe of rectal
cavity in search for narcotics), cert. denied, 386 U.S 945 (1967). These cases appear to be a
concession to the compelling policy considerations that allow other types of border searches
without any suspicion whatsoever. See United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991, 994 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977); J. Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused-
Pretrial Rights § 55, at 352 (1972).
13. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966) (dictum); see United States v.
Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (removal of bullet from thigh unreasonable) cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); United States v. Cameron, 538 F.2d 254, 258 (9th Cir. 1976) (body
search must minimize discomfort and anxiety in addition to meeting "usual procedural require-
ments'); Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366, 378-79 (9th Cir. 1968) (excessive force and lack
of clear indication violative of fourth amendment); Adams v. State, 260 Ind. 663, 668, 299
N.E.2d 834, 836-38 (1973) (surgery absolutely prohibited by fourth amendment), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 935 (1974).
14. An unannounced entry into occupied premises is distinct from a covert entry in surveil-
lance. The entry into occupied premises anticipate-s the alarm and embarrassment of the
occupants. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 57 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Payne v. United
States, 508 F.2d 1391, 1393-94 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 933 (1975). On the other hand,
covert entry in surveillance requires vacancy in order to achieve its purpose of surreptitiously
intercepting conversations. See United States v. Sca.fidi, 564 F.2d 633, 644 (2d Cir. 1977)
(Gurfein, J., concurring), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903 (1978). Covert entry in surveillance
nevertheless imposes its own burden upon interests of the occupants protected by the fourth
amendment. See notes 19-29 infra and accompanying text.
15. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). In that case, a plurality of the Court deemed the
no-notice entry in question to be reasonable under "the particular circumstances," which Included
a reasonable belief that evidence would otherwise be destroyed and that the occupants were
expecting the police. Id. at 40-41. Although the rule of exigency was expressly articulated only by
the dissent, id. at 47 (Brennan, J., dissenting), the Ker decision is widely viewed as establishing
an exigency standard. See, e.g., United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir. 1976);
Meyer v. United States, 386 F.2d 715, 717-18 (9th Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Manduchi
v. Tracy, 350 F.2d 658, 660-62 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 943 (1965); People v. Gastelo, 67
Cal. 2d 586, 589, 432 P.2d 706, 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10, 12 (1967); Commonwealth v. DeMichel,
442 Pa. 553, 561, 277 A.2d 159, 163 (1971).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (1976). This standard is the codification of the exigency standard
established in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d
764, 774 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1303
n.14 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); see United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974,
982 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909 (1975); Note, Electronic Surveillance, Title 111,
and the Requirement of Necessity, 2 Hastings Const. L.Q. 571, 582-86 (1975).
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conducted from outside of the search premises. 17 Accordingly, it is submitted
that a covert entry operation is reasonable under the fourth amendment only
when the less intrusive means of nontrespassory surveillance have failed, or
are likely to fail.18
Surveillance implemented by covert entry is more intrusive than nontres-
passory surveillance because of the unobserved physical presence of govern-
ment agents on private premises without consent. 19 When government agents
are physically present without consent in a target building, they can closely
scrutinize all objects inadvertently discovered within plain view.20 Moreover,
apart from the privacy invasion attendant to the exposure of personal papers
and effects, 21 the bare act of entering the building without consent invades
the occupant's interest, protected by the fourth amendment, in the uninter-
rupted enjoyment of property.22 Finally, the intrusiveness of electronic sur-
17. See notes 19-29 infra and accompanying text.
18. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (1976) (standard of exigency required for the institution of
electronic surveillance). The federal surveillance statute distinguishes "oral communications"
(i.e., face to face conversations) from "wire communications" (i.e., telephone conversations). Id. §
2510 (1)-(2). Despite this distinction the statute does not recognize that the interception of oral
communications is more likely to require covert entry than the interception of wire communica-
tions. Indeed, the statute is "devoid of explicit language either authorizing or prohibiting
surreptitious entries of private premises. . . ." In re United States, 563 F.2d 637, 642 (4th Cir.
1977). For state statutes that set standards for covert entry in addition to those imposed for
electronic surveillance, see note 128 infra.
19. These characteristics flow from the definition of covert entry set forth in note 5 supra.
20. United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see In re United States, S63
F.2d 637, 643 n.6 (4th Cir. 1977). That papers and belongings are among the primary objects of
fourth amendment protection is evidenced by the amendmen's express language ('The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. IV) and by Supreme Court
decisions. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (tangible
items); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482-84 (1965) (papers); Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 463 (1928) (papers and effects). Once government agents are granted the right to enter
private premises, the inadvertent exposure of papers and belongings within plain view as they
pursue their limited purpose is tolerated as an inevitable consequence of the entry. See Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-68 (1971). The observation of objects within plain view is
tolerated, however, only if the initial entry into the premises can pass a test of reasonableness.
See United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d at 162 n.52. Nonetheless, even if the police am granted the
right to enter the premises, they cannot seize objects not within plain view. See United States v.
Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097, 1101 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974). The prohibition
against observing objects not within plain view indicates that it is not merely the act of entry
which is intrusive, and thereby requires a showing of reasonableness, but that the exposure of
papers and objects is itself an intrusive act which requires adequate justification. See Michigan v.
Tyler, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1948 (1978).
21. See note 20supra.
22. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) ('[Plhysical entry
of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed
.... 2); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 177 n.10 (1969) (both "invasion of premises"
and seizure of effects are fourth amendment intrusions); q/. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 349,
350 & n.4 (1967) (fourth amendment protects interests in addition to privacy interests).
Entry into business premises is equally subject to fourth amendment safeguards when the
purpose of the entry is the enforcement of the criminal law. Cf. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United
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veillance implemented by covert entry is demonstrated by the fact that the
physical presence, without consent, of government agents in the building
would necessitate compliance with the reasonableness requirement of the
fourth amendment 23 if it arose in an arrest or in a seizure of tangibles.
24
That the presence of the government agents is unobserved aggravates the
intrusiveness of the entry because it provides an opportunity for intentional
deviation from the limited purposes of the search. 25 This objection to unob-
served search has long been recognized and remains cogent today.
26 Of
course, any evidence not discovered within plain view will be inadmissible
under the exclusionary rule. 27 But, as a practical matter, the accused will
have difficulty sustaining his burden of proving that unobserved government
agents committed illegal acts 28 when, instead of removing property from the
premises, the agents merely examine forbidden objects and thereby obtain
untraceable leads to evidence existing elsewhere. As a result of the difficulty
in excluding this evidence, 29 government agents have the impetus to expand
illegally the scope of their activities in search of papers and belongings outside
of their plain view.
Additionally, some courts have contended that covert entry adds to the
intrusiveness of a surveillance operation because the owner or occupant has
States, 429 U.S. 338, 352-54 (1977) (individuals in business entitled to full fourth amendment
protection when entry furthers the enforcement of laws applicable to all individuals).
More recently, in Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978), the Court held that the
regulatory business inspection at issue required a warrant, id. at 1826, and stated that the "basic
purpose of this Amendment. . . is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by government officials." Id. at 1820 (emphasis added) (quoting Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)). The focus of the search in Marshall was not an
office, where papers are usually present, but rather a production area. Yet, the Court deemed the
invasion more than insignificant, id. at 1825, a fact which supports the view that physical
presence in private premises without consent is objectionable as an invasion of the right to quiet
enjoyment of the premises as well as the right to shield private papers and belongings.
23. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
24. See note 5 supra.
25. See United States v. Gervato, 340 F. Supp. 454, 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (unoccupied
premises vulnerable to a general search), rev'd, 474 F.2d 40 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864
(1973); 57 B.U. L. Rev. 587, 601 (1977).
26. See Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (K.B. 1765); authorities cited note 25
supra.
27. See generally Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
28. The government, however, bears the burden of proving that its evidence Is not a product
of illegality. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); Harlow v. United States,
301 F.2d 361, 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 814 (1962); United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d
629, 636 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952).
29. The defendant can prove that the agents have rummaged in the premises only by linking
the derivative evidence to objects within the premises. This proof will be difficult since, once the
agents have acquired knowledge which is of great use in carrying forward an investigation
against its present suspects or expandifig an investigation to other suspects, continued investiga-
tion is likely to produce means of fabricating a legitimate path to evidence which is, In fact,
illegally acquired. Cf. United States v. Falley, 489 F.2d 33, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1973) (even when
illegal seizure of address book is unquestioned, government successfully argued that it would
have inevitably acquired evidence by completing an arduous saturation search that had barely
begun at the time of the illegal seizure).
[Vol. 47
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only after-the-fact notice of entry.30 This argument appears to rely on the fact
that electronic surveillance in general and no-knock entries, which also
provide only after-the-fact notice, are classified as exceptionally intrusive and
require a showing of exigency. 3 1 This reasoning, however, is unpersuasive.
No-knock entries were placed on a strict exigency basis in order to minimize
the exposure to the government of intimate activities unrelated to the purpose
of the search. 32 Similarly, the exigency standard for electronic surveillance
was designed to protect intimate conversations. 33 In a covert entry-
surveillance operation, however, the premises are unoccupied as a matter of
necessity. 34 The entry exposes neither intimate activities nor intimate conver-
sations.
3 5
Although the lack of prior notice does not render a covert entry operation
more intrusive, the unobserved presence of government agents in private
premises appreciably adds to the intrusiveness of a surveillance operation. 36
As a result, the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement should limit
the use of covert entry to circumstances in which nontrespassory surveillance
is inadequate.
37
30. See United States v. Finazzo, No. 77-5186, slip op. at 18-19 (6th Cir Aug. 28, 1978);
United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 703 (8th Cir. 1976) (Lay, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1045 (1977); In re United States, 438 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (D. Md. 1976), ret'd on other
grounds, 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977).
It has also been suggested that covert entry is exceptionally intrusive because it requires
unseemly government conduct such as breaking-and-entering or entry by deceit. United States v.
Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 704 (8th Cir. 1976) (Lay, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045
(1977). This moral analysis, however, is irrelevant to the question of whether a particular act is
intrusive or not. Covert entry is exceptionally intrusive regardless of whether it is accomplished
through moral or immoral means. In any event, the Supreme Court has indicated that unseemli-
ness, as such, does not enter into fourth amendment analysis. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
484-86 (1976).
31. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
32. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). In addition, giving notice prevents the "shock"
and "fright" as well as the "embarrassment" of the occupants. Id. at 57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of the Ker privacy basis, see Sonnenreich & Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense, An
Alleged Constitutional Problem, 44 St. John's L. Rev. 626, 647 (1970).
33. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967), discussed at note 16 supra and accompany-
ing text.
34. See note 14 supra.
35. Only the papers and belongings of the occupant are exposed. The privacy interest in these
latter items does not appear to be furthered by the no-notice rule. This can be gleaned from
analyzing searches that are conducted with notice. Once the investigating officer announces his
authority to enter, the inhabitants have no right to hide papers and belongings from view if they
fall within the officer's legitimate sphere of search. United States v. Haywood, 284 F. Supp. 245,
249 (E.D. La. 1968); United States v. McKethan, 247 F. Supp. 324, 328 (D.D.C. 1965).
Moreover, if the officer is refused admittance after giving notice, he has the right to break into the
premises without further delay. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976). Under this statute federal officers may
interpret delay after notice as an attempt to destroy evidence and may take action to deny the
occupants the opportunity to conceal or to destroy papers and belongings. See United States v.
Smith, 524 F.2d 1287, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992, 1001 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971). In effect, then, entries conducted with notice are
conducted routinely without notice with respect to the exposure of papers and belongings.
36. See notes 19-29 supra and accompanying text.
37. See notes 11-17 supra and accompanying text.
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II. PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE PRESEARCH JUSTIFICATION OF
REASONABLENESS
Logically arising from the contention that covert entry in implementation of
surveillance requires its own showing of reasonableness is the question of
when the showing of reasonableness must be made. The accused can always
challenge the reasonableness of a search after the fact in a suppression
hearing. The government's obligation to demonstrate the reasonableness of a
search prior to its execution, however, is merely coextensive with the fourth
amendment requirement of showing probable cause. 38 As traditionally inter-
preted, probable cause demands a showing of reasonableness only to the
extent that the government must show a reasonable belief 39 that the objects of
the search are related to the crime40 and are in the place to be explored. 4 1
Therefore, the traditional standard imposes no obligation to justify in advance
the reasonableness of covert entry since its use affects neither the place nor the
criminal relevance of the objects of the electronic search. It will be demon-
strated, however, that a flexible probable cause standard exists under which
more intrusive searches are subject to a more stringent test.42 Guidelines will
be suggested to determine under what circumstances the flexible probable
cause test requires that an exceptionally intrusive action be justified in
advance.43 Pursuant to these guidelines, it will be shown that covert entry
requires a presearch showing of reasonableness, 44 that is, that surveillance
without entry is inadequate. 45
A. Flexible Probable Cause
1. The Early Cases
Under the traditional view all that is necessary for a government showing
of probable cause sufficient to support the issuance of a warrant is a
reasonable belief that a crime has been or is being committed, that the objects
of the search are related to the crime, and that the objects of the search are in
the place to be explored.
46
38. The fourth amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause
.... " U.S. Const., amend. IV. This probable cause requirement functions as the standard of
antecedent justification by which a "particular decision to search is tested against the constitu-
tional standard of reasonableness." Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1976 (1978)
(quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967)).
39. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (citing Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
40. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967); Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 358.
41. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 358; see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35
(1967); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960); Durham v. United States, 403 F.2d 190,
193 (9th Cir. 1968); Schoeneman v. United States, 317 F.2d 173, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1963). For a
recent statement reiterating the three elements of the traditional view, see Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1978 (1978) (citing United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank of Detroit,
536 F.2d 699, 703 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 103') (1977)).
42. See pt. II(A) infra.
43. See pt. II(B) infra.
44. See pt. 11(B) infra.
45. See pt. I supra.
46. See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
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Beginning with Camara v. Municipal Court,47 however, the probable cause
standard has been interpreted more flexibly. In Camara, the Supreme Court
extended the need to obtain a warrant to a municipality's noncriminal search
for building code violations. 48 In so extending the warrant requirement to
mass routine inspections, the Court was confronted with the inappropriate-
ness of measuring probable cause under the traditional test 9 since munici-
palities cannot possibly substantiate the probable existence of violations in
buildings with the same confidence that police, as a result of focused investi-
gation, can assert the probable presence of criminally related objects in a
single suspect building."0 Accordingly, the Court approved the issuance of
warrants by adopting a flexible probable cause test which balanced "the need
to search against the invasion which the search entails." '5 Thus, at least in so
far as a search furthered the enforcement of civil prohibitions, Camara
converted the probable cause test from a narrow scrutiny of the place and
objects of the search to a balancing of the interests in order to determine the
search's overall reasonableness S2
The Court applied a parallel analysis to a criminal search in Terry v.
Ohio.53 In Terry, a policeman, on the basis of less than traditional probable
cause, searched a person whom he reasonably suspected to be armed,
dangerous, and engaged in criminal activity. S4 The Court decided that the
protection of police and third parties outweighed the intrusion caused by a
limited search for weapons and upheld the search on less than the traditional
test's requirement of reasonable belief. s s Although Terry established flexible
probable cause in the context of a warrantless criminal search S6 its balancing
of interests approach was subsequently extended by the Court in dictum in
United States v. United States District CourtS 7 to at least one type of criminal
warrant. In that case, the Court suggested that probable cause for electronic
surveillance orders in criminal investigations that protect domestic security
47. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
48. Id. at 529-30.
49. Note, The Right of the People to be Secure: The Developing Role of the Search Warrant,
42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1119, 1120 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Search Warrant].
50. 387 U.S. at 534-36.
51. Id. at 537.
52. See Greenberg, The Balance of Interest Theory and the Fourth Amendment-A Selective
Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 Cal. L. Rev. 1011, 1013-14 (1973);
LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 Mich.
L. Rev. 39, 55-56 (1968). For two recent administrative searches applying Camara principles, see
Michigan v. Tyler, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1949 (1978) and Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816,
1822 (1978).
53. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see Greenberg, supra note 52, at 1014-15; LaFave, supra note 52, at
54-56.
54. See 392 U.S. at 24.
55. Although the Terry Court referred to the standard of probability as a reasonable belief,
id. at 27, a terminology which is identical to that used in the traditional probable cause standard,
see Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949), the Court expressly stated that its
standard was less stringent. 392 U.S. at 24, 27.
56. See 392 U.S. at 20.
57. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
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can be lower than that required for surveillance orders in investigations of
ordinary crime. 58
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly invoked the Camara flexible
probable cause test to evaluate a warrant procured in the investigation of an
ordinary crime, two decisions suggest that this test applies nevertheless in
such a case. In Berger v. New York, 59 the Supreme Court added to the
traditional probable cause burden by requiring a demonstration of exigency
whenever the government wishes to obtain an order for the electronic
surveillance of conversation. 60 In so doing, the Court established that the
flexible probable cause standard can not only be lessened, as it was in Camara
and Terry, but can also become more rigorous when an exceptionally intrusive
search is involved. 6 1
Schmerber v. California62 similarly points toward a flexible and, in appro-
priate situations, more restrictive probable cause standard. Schmerber sug-
gested that a clear indication of the presence of search objects, rather than a
mere reasonable belief in their existence, is a precondition to a search that
intrudes into the body, such as the blood test at issue in the case. 63 Although
the suggestion arose in the context of a wat-rantless search, 64 Schmerber's
additional assertion that bodily intrusions should nearly always be conducted
pursuant to a warrant 65 would appear to require a clear indication for the
issuance of a warrant authorizing intrusions into the body.66
As the foregoing cases show, the traditional probable cause test has been
interpreted more flexibly in recent years. Moreover, the flexible probable
cause test which has resulted is not a "one-way street" used only to lower
presearch requirements when government interests are compelling.6 7 Instead,
as Berger and Schmerber indicate, presearch requirements must be raised
when an exceptionally intrusive search is to be conducted. 68
2. Recent Developments
Flexible probable cause continues to be a viable approach in defining the
government's burden of presearch justification. In the recent case of Zurcher
v. Stanford Daily, 69 the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment does
58. Id. at 322-23.
59. 388 U.S. 41 (1967), discussed at note 16 supra and accompanying text.
60. Id. at 60.
61. See LaFave, supra note 52, at 55 n.82; Search Warrant, supra note 49, at 1129-30.
62. 384 U.S. 757 (1966), discussed at note 12 supra and accompanying text.
63. Id. at 758-59.
64. See id. at 770.
65. Id.
66. Cf. United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (adversary hearing
required when government requests right to remove evidence by surgery), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1062 (1977); Note, Fourth Amendment Balancing and Searches Into the Body, 31 U. Miami L.
Rev. 1504, 1513 (1977) (request to perform surgery should be granted only when object sought is
only available evidence).
67. Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 464-65 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68. See notes 59-66 supra and accompanying text.
69. 98 S. Ct. 1970 (1978).
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not require a showing that a subpoena duces tecum would be impracticable
before a warrant can be issued to search the premises of a third party
unsuspected of crime"° and that when the third party premises to be searched
are that of a newspaper, an even clearer showing of impracticability is not
required. 71 Although the Court stated that the traditional showing of probable
cause-the reasonable belief of finding criminally related objects in a given
location-was per se grounds for the issuance of any criminal warrant,7 2 the
decision nevertheless evinces the Court's continued support for the flexible
probable cause test.
In its decision, the Zurcher majority rejected more stringent warrant
requirements on the ground that searches of unsuspected third parties were
not exceptionally intrusive. Indeed, as Justice White noted in the majority
opinion, searches of the premises of third parties not suspected of a crime are,
if anything, less intrusive than ordinary searches of premises occupied by
suspects since the objects of the search generally will not incriminate the
unsuspected third party. 73 On the other hand, by requiring a magistrate to
apply warrant requirements with "particular exactitude" in a search invading
first amendment interests,74 the Court did seem to give more explicit recogni-
tion to the flexible probable cause standard. The Court viewed this additional
obligation of "particular exactitude" as an adequate safeguard against the
potential abuses of the power to search because it imposed a duty upon a
magistrate to tailor the search warrant so as to prevent rummaging through
extraneous materials, interference with the timely publication of the news-
paper, and bulk seizures that would be tantamount to "prior restraints."7 5
Moreover, the Court expressly reserved the right to impose additional re-
quirements if "particular exactitude" proved to be an inadequate curb upon
the police in searches invading first amendment interests. 7 6
Thus, the disposition of the newspaper claim in Zurcher, as well as the
disposition of the unsuspected third party claim, is indicative of a pragmatic
rather than a doctrinaire approach to probable cause.7 7 The Court's rejection
of the novel contention that the impracticability of a subpoena should be a
precondition to obtaining a search warrant should not be interpreted as a
renunciation of the policy established in Berger and Schmerber of requiring,
in appropriate circumstances, a stricter standard of presearch justification
than that of traditional probable cause. 78
70. Id. at 1979. For the rule of impracticability fashioned by the lower courts in Zurcher, see
id. at 1975.
71. See id. at 1980-83.
72. Id. at 1978.
73. Id. at 1976.
74. Id. at 1982.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Justice Powell also approved of the flexible approach: "As the Court's opinion makes clear
... the magistrate must judge the reasonableness of every warrant in light of the circumstances
of the particular case, carefully considering the description of the evidence sought, the situation of
the premises, and the position and interests of the owner or occupant." Id. at 1984 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
78. See notes 59-66 supra and accompanying text.
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B. The Presearch Justification ofReasonableness for Covert Entry
Not all exceptionally intrusive police actions should be subjected to stan-
dards of presearch justification more stringent than those imposed under the
traditional probable cause test. Some police actions, even when occurring in a
search pursuant to warrant, are justifiable only by circumstances that do not
arise until the moment of search. For example, justification for entering an
occupied premises without a knock on the door and an announcement of
authority cannot possibly exist before the search. Instead, the need for the
no-knock entry arises on the spur of the raoment when the police, upon
arriving at the place of search, determine that evidence is about to be
destroyed. 79
When prior justification is not an impossibility, however, it is suggested
that the need for more stringent probable cause requirements should be
determined by balancing the burden on law enforcement officials against the
fulfillment of the functions performed by the process of prior justification.8 0
These functions are the avoidance of a postsearch determination of rea-
sonableness in which hindsight clouds the factual issues, 8' and the substitu-
tion of the judgment of magistrates for that of overzealous executing officers
to prevent unjustifiable intrusions before they are carried out.8 2 Based upon
these guidelines, the reasonableness of covert entry should be determined
prior to search.
The additional burden on the government of providing prior justification
for a covert entry does not appear significant. Indeed, responsible law officers
appear willing to show why some sort of covert entry is required.8 3 Addition-
ally, prior justification for covert entry imposes only an administrative burden
on the government and does not directly inhibit its ability to apprehend
79. See People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal. 2d 586, 588-89, 432 P.2d 706, 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10, 12
(1967).
80. Cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761-63 (1969) (warrantless search incident to
arrest protects arresting officer); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (warrantless
search of car for contraband justified by vehicle's mobility).
81. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976). This case also sets forth
another purpose of prior justification: to give prior notice of authority to search to the party
whose person or property is to be searched. Id. This function, however, is not served by a
surveillance order authorizing covert entry because, by definition, covert entry is a secret
operation in which the occupants of the premises to be searched are not informed of the entry
until after the fact. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
82. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1972).
83. See McNamara, The Problem of Surreptitious Entry To Effectuate Electronic Eavesdrops:
How Do You Proceed After the Court Says "Yes"?, 15 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 27 (1977) (author, an
assistant United States attorney, recommends inclusion of express entry provision in a surveil-
lance order as a means of indicating that magistrate struck privacy-public interest balance In
favor of entry). Indeed, law officers were aware of the need for prior justification of covert entry
in surveillance before the issue ever surfaced in the courts. See National Commission for the
Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance,
Electronic Surveillance Report (1976) [hereinafter cited as National Commission). In this report,
the majority of the commission recommended that judges be required to authorize explicitly entry
to plant a surveillance device. Id. at 15. The recommendation was based in part on the doubts of
law enforcement officials as to the propriety of entering without authorization. See id. at 14.
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criminals. In all but the rarest of circumstances, the government must obtain
an electronic surveillance order before it may conduct surveillance.8 4 There-
fore, adding a justification of covert entry to the other contents of the
surveillance application, though increasing the paperwork, 5 does not entail
an additional trip to the magistrate, which might further delay an opportunity
to gather evidence. Moreover, the proof of the inadequacy of surveillance
without entry will add little to the administrative burden when the govern-
ment's request for permission to enter is in good faith and not prompted by
the desire to rummage within the premises.8 6 Because covert entry is a
difficult and dangerous procedure,8 7 a good faith request will probably be the
result of the government's already completed inquiry into the inadequacy of
surveillance without entry.
On the other hand, while imposing only an incremental burden upon the
government, mandatory presearch justification of covert entry appreciably
furthers at least one purpose of presearch justification. Admittedly, one
function of presearch justification, the avoidance of a postsearch determina-
tion of reasonableness in which hindsight distorts the factual issues, 88 is not
served. In many instances the government's after-the-fact justification of the
covert action may be of a technical or otherwise dear-cut variety which is
plainly attributable to what was known about the premises or the search
subjects prior to obtaining the surveillance order.8 9
A prior determination of the reasonableness of covert entry, however,
undoubtedly does perform the function of substituting the judgment of a
judge for that of an overzealous law enforcement officer. Of course, an
individual might be adequately protected without a prior determination by a
judge if the investigating official's judgment was tempered by his recognition
84. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-18 (1972). A surveillance
order is not necessary when one party to the desired conversations consents to the surveillance.
See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750 (1971). In addition, even if consent is not given
the surveillance, the federal statute controlling government-conducted electronic surveillance
permits the search without an order when an "emergency situation exists with respect to
conspiratorial activities threatening the national security interest or to conspirational activities
characteristic of organized crime." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7)(a) (1976). State exceptions to the
surveillance order requirement can be no broader than the federal exceptions. See note 3 supra.
85. Requiring prior approval of covert entry would only incrementally add to the lengthy
process whereby a detailed application must be approved by a law enforcement official before it is
submitted to the magistrate. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(1), 2S18(1) (1976). For a discussion of the
arduousness of the present procedures, see National Commission, supra note 83, at 7.
86. See note 20supra.
87. See National Commission, supra note 83, at 15, 44.
88. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
89. For example, the inadequacy of wiretapping as an alternative to entering covertly to
install a surveillance device can be demonstrated by simply resubmitting the unproductive
wiretapping tapes which, by statute, must already have been brought to the attention of the
magistrate upon the completion of the- unsuccessful wiretap. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1976).
The existence of an antiwiretapping phone system would also be dearly probative of the
inadequacy of tapping. See United States v. Volpe, 430 F. Supp. 931, 936 (D. Conn. 1977).
Once wiretapping is proved inadequate, the impossibility of acquiring face-to-face conversations
by means other than covert entry could be shown by readily verifiable facts, such as the structural
impossibility of using adjoining premises to intercept in-room conversations.
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that the entry might need to be justified in an after-the-fact suppression
hearing. It is equally possible, however, that the opportunity to scrutinize
legally any incriminating matter within plain view and to scrutinize illegally
any concealed objects while he is on the premises unobserved9" could well
lead an officer to gamble that the unauthorized covert entry will be deemed
reasonable in a suppression hearing. The presearch justification of entry
eliminates the risk in relying on a law enforcement official's discretion and
instead affords the individual more solid protection in the hands of an
impartial magistrate. Since the magistrate's disinterested determination fulfills
perhaps the most important purpose of the requirement of prior justification9
without imposing a considerable burden upon the government, 92 it is main-
tained that the fourth amendment requires that the government demonstrate
the reasonableness of covert entry, namely that less intrusive means of
electronic surveillance are inadequate, prior to the issuance of the warrant.
III. EXPRESS WARRANT AUTHORIZATION FOR COVERT ENTRY
Without deciding the threshold question of whether entry in surveillance
requires a presearch determination of reasonableness, 93 several courts have
decided that the magistrate's approval of the entry need not take the form of
an express warrant authorization. 94 The better view, however, is that the
particularity clause of the fourth amendment requires express warrant au-
thorization of covert entry. 9s It will be maintained that this requirement
cannot be satisfied by arguing that express authorization of the interception of
in-room conversations is tantamount to express authorization of a covert
entry.96 Finally, it will be suggested that the entry provision, although
mandatory, need not be drawn with exactitude. 97
90. See notes 20-21, 25-29 supra and accompanying text.
91. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1972).
92. See notes 83-87 supra and accompanying text.
93. But see note 94 infra.
94. United States v. Dalia, 575 F.2d 1344, 1346 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 78 (1978)
(No. 77-1722); United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
903 (1978); United States v. London, 424 F. Supp. 556, 560 (D. Md. 1976), qtJ'd on other grounds
sub noma. United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1977). Scafidi and London suggest
that probable cause for surveillance is adequate presearch justification for entry. "Once a judicial
officer is convinced by the facts presented to him that electronic surveillance will aid in the
detection of crime, his authorization that it be used should then transfer to the appropriate police
agency the decision as to ne precise mechanical means whereby the order is to be carried out."
United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d at 640. "Realistically, this intrusion [covert entry] was no
greater than the interceptions themselves, which were judicially authorized after a finding of
probable cause." United States v. London, 424 F. Supp. at 560. Both cases, however, primarily
relied on the "implied authorization" theory in deciding that an express provision is not necessary.
See pt. III(B) infra.
95. United States v. Finazzo, No. 77-5186, slip op. at 27 (6th Cir. Aug. 28, 1978) (Celebrezze,
J., concurring); In re United States, 563 F.2d 637, 644 (4th Cir. 1977) (dictum); United States v.
Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Finazzo, 429 F. Supp. 803, 806-07
(E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd on other grounds, No. 77-5186 (6th Cir. Aug. 28, 1978); see pt. I1(A)
infra. See also United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 696 n.13 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1045 (1977).
96. See pt. III(B) infra.
97. See pt. 1i1(C) infra.
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A. The Particularity Clause and Express Authorization
Three fourth amendment requirements exist for a valid warrant-issuance
by a neutral magistrate, probable cause, and particularity. 98 Of these, only
particularity must be satisfied by the inclusion of an express provision in the
warrant. The particularity requirement demands that a warrant "particularly
describ[e] the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." 99
The judiciary has traditionally applied a literal interpretation to the lan-
guage of the particularity clause. The Supreme Court has characterized the
language of the clause as "precise and clear" 00 and therefore satisfied when
the location and the objects of the search have been adequately described in
the warrant.' 0'
Notwithstanding the strong precedential support for the literal approach to
particularity, such an approach should not be a talismanic solution to every
instance in which the facial adequacy of a warrant is in question.' 0 2 This
point is dramatically illustrated by Katz v. United States. ' 0 3 In that case, the
Supreme Court rejected the long-standing view that the original purpose of
the fourth amendment's "unreasonable searches and seizures" clause limited
its protection to the tangible interests represented by the clause's reference to
"persons, houses, papers, and effects.' 0 4 The Court instead decided that the
broader fourth amendment objective of protecting "people," rather than their
bodies and their property, enconpassed a right to conversational privacy.' 0 5
Similarly, although the particularity clause's literal requirement of describ-
ing the "objects" and "place" of search is reflective of an original intention to
prevent ransacking physical intrusions, 0 6 it is submitted, on the basis of
98. See W, arden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309-10 (1967); Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 358.
99. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
100. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965).
101. See id.; United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1313 (8th Cir. 1976); J. Cook, supra
note 12, § 26, at 177-78; Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 358. See generally ML-ascolo, Specificity
Requirements for Warrants Under the Fourth Amendment: Defining the Zone of Privacy, 73
Dick. L. Rev. 1 (1968).
102. One case eschewing the literal approach by expanding the particularity clause's require-
ments is Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). The Berger Court criticized the New York
surveillance statute for allowing the authorization of eavesdropping at length, continuously,
without prompt execution, and without termination upon obtaining the desired conversations. Id.
at 59-60. The federal surveillance statute, drawn to comply with Berger without unduly hindering
law enforcement, see note 3 supra, requires inclusion in the surveillance order of the temporal
limitations suggested by the court with only slight modification. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(c), (5)
(1976).
103. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
104. Id. at 352-53. Katz overruled Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463, 465 (1928),
in which the Court relied on the original purpose and literal construction of the "unreasonable
searches and seizures" clause to exclude intangibles from fourth amendment protection. Compare
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 364-67 (Black, J., dissenting) (Kats majority criticized for
departing from original purpose and literalism) with Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. at 476
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (Olmstead majority criticized for adhering to literal interpretation of
fourth amendment).
105. 389 U.S. at 353; see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-74 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (fourth amendment should have "wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth" and should be construed so as to preserve "value" of its "general principles").
106. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 367-68 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting
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Katz, that the particularity clause should be recognized as more broadly
functioning to "protect people" by limiting a search in all respects to those
government actions that have been justified by a presearch showing of
probable cause. This function is evidenced by the manner in which the
particularity clause as traditionally interpreted has interacted with the tradi-
tional probable cause standard.
Operating in conjunction with the traditional probable cause standard, 10 7
the particularity clause requires that the warrant expressly name only those
objects which have been shown to be probably related to a crime10 8 and only
those places which have been shown to be probable locations of the search
objects.' 0 9 In doing so, the particularity of the warrant notifies the occupant
of the premises of the scope of the executing officer's authority." t0 Even more
significantly, the particularity requirement provides protection to the individ-
ual by requiring the executing officer to look only to the warrant to determine
the extent of his authority."' This clear-cut rule for determining the scope of
his authority prevents the officer from overestimating the extent to which the
issuing magistrate has found the proof of probable cause to be adequate and
thus minimizes the risk that the officer will search unjustified places and seize
unauthorized objects.112
In recent years, the traditional probable cause standard has been applied
more flexibly." 3 When this doctrine of flexible probable cause requires that
the government show justification for aspects of a search other than its place
and its objects, such as an electronic surveillance search implemented by
covert entry,' ' 4 it is suggested that the warrant should expressly indicate,
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928)); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481
(1965); Mascolo, supra note 101, at 2-3.
107. See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Andersen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 430-82 (1976) (objects named in warrant
sufficiently related to a specific crime); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961)
(warrant overbroad for failing to specify only those publications which have been shown to be
probably obscene); Mascolo, supra note 101, at 6.
109. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1975-76 (1978); United States v. Hinton,
219 F.2d 324, 326 (7th Cir. 1955); Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 358; Mascolo, supra note 101, at
6.
110. United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1315 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v, Marti,
421 F.2d 1263, 1268 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 947 (1971); see United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976).
111. Mascolo, supra note 101, at 10-I1; see Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965);
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); United States v. Johnson, 541 F,2d 1311,
1315 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263, 1268 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 947 (1971). To determine the scope of his authority, an officer may also look to an
underlying affidavit of probable cause if it is incorporated by reference and attached to the
warrant. See United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d at 1315; United States v. Moore, 461 F.2d 1236,
1238 (D.C. Cir. 1972). But see United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 45-46 (3d Cir. 1975)
(dictum) (incorporation of magistrate's oral statements by reference may be permissible).
112. See Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503-04 (1925); United States v. Johnson, 541
F.2d 1311, 1313 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263, 1268 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 947 (1971).
113. See pt. II(A)supra.
114. See pt. II(B) supra.
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both to the searching party and the party to be searched, whether the
magistrate has decreed the additional intrusion of covert entry justifiable.
Although such a provision will not give prior notice to the owners or
occupants of the premises since the entry is by definition covert, 1 5 it will
fulfill the particularity clause function of clearly informing the officer whether
or not the entry has been approved. 1 6 In the same way that express
authorization of the target premises and the conversations to be seized
minimizes possible official misunderstanding as to the justifiable scope of
surveillance, 1 17 express authorization of the covert entry protects the individ-
ual from an unjustifiable entry. To deny the individual this added margin of
protection is to interpret the particularity clause too narrowly in light of both
the breadth with which fourth amendment language has been usually inter-
preted 1 8 and the need to keep the particularity clause abreast of the recent
changes in the probable cause standard." 9
B. The Implied Authorization Argument
The language of a warrant is the sole source of search authority unless the
warrant incorporates supplementary information by express reference.' 20
Thus, unincorporated indications of a planned covert entry, such as the
magistrate's actual knowledge, cannot be used to fulfill the warrant authoriza-
tion requirements. 12' Nevertheless, two courts have argued that the language
of the warrant implies authorization to enter covertly when the warrant
expressly authorizes the interception of in-room, as opposed to telephone,
conversations. 122
The faulty premise of this argument lies in the presumption that covert
entry inevitably implements in-room interceptions. 23 At the Supreme Court
level alone, four cases have involved the interception of in-room conversations
115. See note 81 supra.
116. See notes 111-12 supra and accompanying text.
117. See notes 107-12 supra and accompanying text.
118. See notes 102-05 supra and accompanying text.
119. See notes 106-14 supra and accompanying text.
120. See United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1315 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Moore, 461 F.2d 1236, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
121. See United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 45-46 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879, 884 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
122. United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1977). cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903
(1978); United States v. London, 424 F. Supp. 556, 560 (D. Aid. 1976), qff'd on other grounds sub
nom. United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1977); see United States v. Dalia, 575
F.2d 1344, 1346 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 78 (1978) (No. 77-1722) (sustains
surveillance order without entry provision because there was probable cause for surveillance,
reasonably executed covert entry, and awareness by the issuing magistrate that covert entry was
"appropriate").
123. United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1977) ("It would be highly naive to
impute to a district judge a belief that the device required to effect his bugging authorization did
not require installation.'), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903 (1978); United States v. London, 424 F.
Supp. 556, 560 (D. Md. 1976) ("Necessarily concomitant to and envisioned in the court order, this
court believes, was the covert installation of the recording devices."), off'd on other grounds sub
nom. United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1977).
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without the use of covert entry. 12 4 An expanding technology has provided
alternatives to in-room installations 125 and has increased the likelihood that
the government will choose means of in-room interception that do not entail
the acknowledged risks of discovery attendant to a covert entry.' 26 Moreover,
as a practical matter, the "Watergate overtones" of covert entry have appar-
ently influenced government officials to employ other means of acquiring
in-room conversations. 127 Finally, the Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New
York surveillance statutes, which require express authorization for secret
entry when it is used to implement electronic surveillance,12 8 further indicate
that entry is not inextricably linked to in-room surveillance.
The lack of a hand-in-hand relationship between in-room interception and
covert entry fatally flaws the implied authorization argument. The fourth
amendment requires that the warrant allow the executing officer to be able to
"ascertain" with "reasonable effort" the scope of his authority. 129 Clearly,
then, it is not reasonable to interpret silence as a green light to take an action
like covert entry, which is intrusive enough to require a mandatory presearch
determination of reasonableness, 30 when that act of covert entry does not
inevitably accompany the activities authorized by the warrant's express
language.13'
124. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 244-45 (1969) (microphone between doors of
adjoining hotel rooms); Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (spike mike in wall), rev'g per
curiam 204 Va. 275, 130 S.E.2d 437 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, $06 (1961)
(spike mike in wall); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 131-34 (1942) (detectophone placed
on outer wall).
125. See National Commission For the Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, Commission Studies 169, 171-72, 181-82 (1976).
126. National Commission, supra note 83, at 15, 44.
127. See United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879, 881 (D.D.C. 1976), ff'd, 553 F.2d 146
(D.C. Cir. 1977). In Ford, the police elected to employ a bomb scare ruse in order to avoid the
stigma of breaking-and-entering. Id.
128. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-41(e)(10) (West Supp. 1978); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272,
§ 99(1)(5) (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 700.30(8) (McKinney 1971).
129. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925); United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d
1311, 1313 (8th Cir. 1976).
130. See pt. 1(B) supra.
131. An additional argument against the express warrant authorization of covert entry was
set forth in United States v. London, 424 F. Supp. 556 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd on other grounds sub
nom. United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1977). In that case, the district court
contended that covert entry need not be authorized in the warrant because, as a practical matter,
even if a covert entry provision were constitutionally required, and was left out, the content of
any of the conversations intercepted would still be admissible so long as the electronic surveil-
lance itself was expressly authorized in the warrant. Id. at 560 (dictum) (citing Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)). This contention is based upon the fourth amendment
doctrine of "attenuation," which admits unconstitutionally seized evidence when the causation
between the police's illegal act and the ultimate seizure of the evidence is "attenuated," as
opposed to proximate, because of sufficient intervening acts. Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). Although this
doctrine is notoriously murky, Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 361, its requirements appear to be
that the unconstitutional police actions produce the evidence in unforeseeable ways, see Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486-88 (1976) (illegally acquired evidence is to be excluded only when the
deterrent effect on the police is appreciable), or by means of intervening and sufficiently voluntary
COVERT ENTRY
C. Express Authorization Specifics
Although express warrant authorization for covert entry should be manda-
tory, the warrant need only state that a covert entry operation has been
authorized, and need not specify the manner or time of day of entry. 132
Limiting the government to a specified manner of covert entry would serve
little purpose. In the absence of injury to the occupants or significant damage
to the premises, it is difficult to see how one manner of covert entry could be
more objectionable than the next. 133 It is, moreover, unnecessary to proscribe
either of these abuses by requiring a warrant description of the manner of
covert entry since it is highly unlikely that the government would attempt to
frustrate the inherently surreptitious purpose of the covert entry by causing
personal injury or significant property damage in its execution.' 34
Case law addressing time of day in other than covert entry situations
indicates that it is not a significant factor in determining the fourth amend-
ment reasonableness of a search in either presearch or postsearch scrutiny. 13S
To the limited extent that nighttime searches of occupied premises have been
deemed exceptionally intrusive, their offensiveness has been said to lie in the
necessity of awakening the occupants in order to provide notice of search.136
In entering to plant surveillance equipment, however, the government agents
will strive to conceal their purpose by entering the premises when unoc-
statements. See, e.g., United States v. Mullens, 536 F.2d 997, 1000 (2d Cir. 1976). Neither of
these alternative preconditions to the application of the "attenuation" doctrine appear to be
satisfied in the case of covert entry. The only utterances involved in a covert entry are the seized
conversations themselves which are certainly not made voluntarily to the government listeners.
Moreover, it is equally clear that the police, in covertly entering, intended to capture the very
conversations which they eventually "seize" and that, therefore, the conversations are not an
unforeseeable product of the entry.
The cryptic district court opinion may be suggesting, however, that the relevant claim of
causation is "attenuated" because it extends, not from the illegal entry to the seizure of
conversations, but from the illegal omission of an entry provision to the seizure. Lengthening the
causal chain does not attenuate the relationship between the illegality and the seizure of the
evidence because, in any event, the failure to provide the covert entry provision in the warrant
will render the conversations inadmissible. This is evident from other cases in which evidence has
been excluded when the warrant is facially inadequate. E.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476
(1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
132. Cf. United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 169-70 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Although the Ford
court nominally limited its holding to a determination that the surveillance order was overbroad,
id. at 170, the opinion also criticized the warrant for its "failure" to "limit" the time of entry. Id.
Because the order in question simply omitted reference to time of day, see id. at 149, 150, there is
a strong intimation that the Ford court would have deemed an authorization that did not address
the details of entry just as objectionable as a broad authorization granting too much latitude as to
details. Moreover, the court's repeated assertion that there is a duty to provide a particularized or
circumscribed authorization, see id. at 154-55, 158, strongly suggests that bare mention of the
fact of entry would not satisfy the Ford court.
133. The risk of discovery, and the attendant possibility of confrontation, applies equally to
both ruses and breaking-and-entering. See National Commission, supra note 83, at 15.
134. See note 14 supra.
135. See Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 446 (1974) (statute pertaining to service of
search warrants for controlled substances held not to differentiate between daytime and nighttime
searches).
136. See id. at 462 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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cupied. 137 Accordingly, the omission of any reference to the time of day or the
inclusion of a nighttime entry provision should not render the warrant
overbroad.
On the other hand, a warrant authorizing more than one covert entry
should be deemed overboard. 138 Any covert entry is exceptionally intrusive
and thus necessitates a presearch showing that less intrusive means of
implementing electronic surveillance are inadequate. 139 The government can-
not show the need for covert entries other than the first until it can demon-
strate that the initial installation of surveillance equipment is inadequate. The
inadequacy of the original installation, however, will only arise subsequent to
the initial entry when the inability to overhear conversations necessitates
repairing or repositioning the surveillance device.
This obligation to justify and to authorize entries on an individual basis
does not, however, diminish the government's leeway with regard to the
manner and time of entry. Authorization of entries upon an individual basis is
instead merely consistent with the view that covert entry is a seriously
intrusive police action, justifiable only when the attempted surveillance is
otherwise likely to fail.
CONCLUSION
The common thread running through the foregoing analysis of covert entry
in electronic surveillance is that stiffer fourth amendment standards must be
substituted for the traditional rules of thumb in evaluating the reasonableness
of an exceptionally intrusive search and the adequacy of its procedural
safeguards. 140 Accordingly, it has been argued that the need for a covert entry
in implementation of surveillance must be evaluated prior to search by a
neutral judge and, if deemed to be reasonable, must be expressly approved in
the surveillance order. This approach is not an exercise in judicial legislation
which unduly stretches the limits of fourth amendment protection. Instead, it
is an approach consistent with the frequent instances in which the Supreme
Court has flexibly applied constitutional standards to accommodate the en-
forcement of the criminal law and other important public interests. 14'
Richard H. Sternberg
137. See note 14supra.
138. See United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
139. See notes 11-18 supra and accompanying text.
140. See notes 11-18, 46-68, 106-19 supra and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-58 (1976); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 495 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880-85 (1975);
Chime] v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761-63 (1969); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153
(1925); notes 47-58 supra and accompanying text.
